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The Eurosystem has regularly faced very strong demand 
for  liquidity  from  the  euro  area  banking  sector  since 
9 August 2007, after the tension on the American sub-
prime mortgage market spread to other market segments 
and  other  economic  regions.  This  article  describes  the 
way in which the Eurosystem responded to this increased 
demand for liquidity via its open market operations. In so 
doing, it discusses the liquidity management during the 
period between 8 August and 13 November – the last 
day  of  the  tenth  reserve  maintenance  period  in  2007, 
which is also the cut-off date for the information used in 
this article – thus raising the question whether the supply 
of additional liquidity during that period plays any role 
in signalling the monetary policy stance. Supplying extra 
liquidity for the market could in fact be seen as a factor 
encouraging money creation and therefore indicating an 
easing of monetary policy.
Nevertheless, the Eurosystem’s monetary policy stance is 
clearly determined by the level of the key interest rates, 
and more specifically the minimum bid rate applied to 
the main refinancing operations : these are weekly open 
market operations which, as will become apparent, gen-
erally cover most of the liquidity needs of the resident 
banking  sector.  Since  that  rate  remained  unchanged 
during the period considered, the monetary policy stance 
also remained the same. The operational framework used 
to implement monetary policy is designed to adjust the 
liquidity supply to demand, so that the very short-term 
interest rates on the money market settle down at levels 
close to the minimum bid rate. That therefore maximises 
the  signalling  function  on  the  monetary  policy  stance. 
This  implies  that  the  Eurosystem  conducts  an  interest 
rate  policy  in  which  both  the  liquidity  supply  and  the 
structure of its balance sheet become endogenous, and 
therefore cease to provide information on the monetary 
policy  stance.  The  central  banks  of  other  industrialised 
countries with well-developed financial markets have also 
opted to conduct an interest rate policy. Another article 
in this Economic Review explains why it is usual to adopt 
an interest rate policy, and how that choice affects the 
interpretation of central bank balance sheets (1).
The article is structured as follows. The first section deals 
with the Eurosystem’s key intrest rates. The second sec-
tion  discusses  the  Eurosystem’s  liquidity  management 
under  normal  circumstances.  The  third  section  explains 
how  the  Eurosystem  managed  the  liquidity  situation 
during the period from the beginning of August to mid 
November 2007, in the context of the turbulence on the 
money  market.  The  final  section  summarises  the  main 
conclusions.
*      The authors wish to thank Serge Bertholomé, Eddy De Koker, Hugues Famerée, 
Christoph Machiels, Vincent Périllieux and Thomas Schepens for their 
contributions to this article.
(1)  Aucremanne L., J. Boeckx and O. Vergote (2007), Interest rate policy or monetary 
base policy : implications for a central bank’s balance sheet, Economic Review of 
the National Bank of Belgium, III, 17-26.
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was  sometimes  very  strong.  These  broadly  correspond 
to  the  period  from  the  beginning  of  August  to  mid 
November 2007.
2.    Steering money market interest rates 
under normal conditions : liquidity 
management by the Eurosystem in 
the first seven reserve maintenance 
periods in 2007
The  Eurosystem’s  consolidated  balance  sheet  offers  an 
overview of the liquidity supply and demand. The assets 
side of the balance sheet shows liquidity-providing items, 
while the liabilities side records items which are liquidity- 
absorbing. To understand the essence of the operational 
framework of monetary policy, it is sufficient to refer to 
a simplified presentation of the Eurosystem balance sheet 
in which all items are divided into three main categories : 
autonomous liquidity factors, current account holdings of 
credit institutions – known as the reserves – and monetary 
policy instruments.
Three factors explain the banks’ liquidity needs : autono-
mous  liquidity  factors,  reserve  requirements  and  any 
excess reserves. The autonomous factors are determined 
either by the public’s behaviour or by institutional arrange-
ments, so that the Eurosystem generally has no influence 
over them (2). Examples are the banknotes in circulation 
and government deposits on the accounts of certain cen-
tral banks. Since the sum of these factors is higher on the 
liabilities side than on the assets side, the banking sector 
faces a structural liquidity deficit vis-à-vis the Eurosystem.
A  second  important  component  of  the  liquidiity  needs 
consists of the minimum reserve requirements imposed on 
credit institutions. The amount of the reserves to be main-
tained is determined for each credit institution according 
to the reserve basis, which includes the majority of its 
short-term  liabilities.  It  is  calculated  by  multiplying  the 
reserve basis by the 2 p.c. reserve ratio. Credit institutions 
can deduct a lump-sum allowance from their minimum 
reserve requirements in order to reduce the administrative 
expense  of  managing  very  small  reserve  requirements. 
The minimum reserves must be maintained on average 
over the reserve maintenance period, so that the current 
account holdings of credit institutions may – subject to 
that constraint – fluctuate freely in relation to the amount 
of the reserves to be maintained. Since March 2004, the 
1.  The Eurosystem’s key rates
At the start of each month, the ECB Governing Council 
discusses the monetary policy stance to be adopted. For 
that purpose, it conducts a structured analysis of all the 
relevant economic information at its disposal. On the basis 
of that economic and monetary analysis, it systematically 
considers  the  risks  to  price  stability  and  consequently 
determines the key interest rates of the Eurosystem (1).
The ECB Governing Council indicates the monetary policy 
stance by setting the minimum bid rate for the main refi-
nancing operations. In 2007, that rate was raised from 
3.5 to 3.75 p.c. in March, before being increased again 
to 4 p.c. in June. While a further tightening of monetary 
policy  was  widely  expected  in  the  early  summer  –  as 
the  Governing  Council  had  hinted  at  that  in  its  com-
munication  –,  this  expectation  faded  during  August. 
Subsequently, the Governing Council effectively kept the 
minimum bid rate unchanged after each of its monthly 
discussions. On each occasion it stated that, in view of 
the increased uncertainty, it would need to obtain addi-
tional information before drawing further conclusions for 
monetary policy.
The other two key rates of the Eurosystem form a sym-
metrical  corridor  of  100  basis  points  on  either  side  of 
the minimum bid rate. The rate of the marginal lending 
facility, which enables banks facing unexpected liquidity 
needs to obtain overnight credit backed by eligible assets, 
has stood at 5 p.c. since June 2007, whereas the rate of 
the deposit facility, which offers banks the opportunity to 
deposit surplus liquidity overnight, has been 3 p.c. since 
then. The overnight interest rates fluctuate within those 
margins,  because  if  the  interbank  interest  rates  were 
higher or lower, that would imply that banks could borrow 
or deposit funds on more advantageous terms with the 
Eurosystem than on the interbank market. Furthermore, 
the rates applicable to these standing facilities are so puni-
tive compared to the minimum bid rate that banks are 
strongly encouraged to deposit their surpluses and cover 
their deficits on the interbank market before resorting to 
the Eurosystem’s standing facilities.
By  active  liquidity  management  –  i.e.  by  adjusting  the 
supply of liquidity in line with demand from the banking 
system – the Eurosystem is able to influence short-term 
interest  rates  on  the  interbank  market  to  bring  them 
into line with the minimum bid rate. It thus tries to safe-
guard  the  signal  reflecting  the  monetary  policy  stance. 
To that end, an operational framework was developed : 
the way in which it functions is explained below, both 
under normal market conditions and during the last three 
reserve maintenance periods when demand for liquidity 
(1)    Chapter 4 of the ECB publication entitled “The monetary policy of the ECB” gives 
a more detailed account of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.
(2)    The movements in the autonomous liquidity factors resulting from possible 
intervention by the Eurosystem on the foreign exchange markets are an 
exception to this rule. However, there is no direct link between these and the 
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A substantial part of the liquidity needs of credit institu-
tions is covered by the longer-term refinancing operations. 
These operations, conducted monthly with a three-month 
maturity, offer credit institutions a stable source of financ-
ing. The Governing Council decided to allot an amount of 
50 billion euro in each operation from 1 February 2007, 
so that the outstanding total of the longer-term refinanc-
ing operations has stood at 150 billion euro since the end 
of March. However, as will become apparent later in this 
article, that amount increased further during the period 
of money market turmoil. As the longer-term refinancing 
operations are not intended to signal the monetary policy 
stance, they are usually executed by variable rate tenders 
with  a  pre-announced  volume.  That  means  that  the 
bids offering the highest interest rates are allotted first, 
followed by the lower rate bids until the total liquidity 
available for allotment has been exhausted. At the lowest 
interest rate accepted, called the marginal rate, bids are 
allotted pro rata. For each individual allotment, the inter-
est rate applied is the rate offered by the counterparty, so 
that it is possible to calculate a weighted average rate.
The Eurosystem generally covers the bulk of the credit 
institutions’ liquidity needs via the weekly main refinanc-
ing operations. These operations with a maturity of one 
week are conducted via variable rate tenders. The lowest 
interest  rate  which  credit  institutions  can  bid,  known 
as  the  minimum  bid  rate,  is  fixed  each  month  by  the 
Governing Council and is intended to signal the monetary 
policy stance. In order to provide the counterparties with 
sufficient information on the total liquidity needs of the 
length of the reserve maintenance periods has been about 
one month, since they start on the settlement date of the 
first main refinancing operation following the Governing 
Council meeting at which the monetary policy decision 
was taken, and end the day before the corresponding set-
tlement day in the next month. The current account hold-
ings maintained by credit institutions are remunerated up 
to the level of the reserve requirement, so that the system 
of minimum reserve requirements does not impose any 
additional costs on the banking sector. The remuneration 
corresponds to the average, over the reserve maintenance 
period,  of  the  marginal  rate  of  allotment  on  the  main 
refinancing operations.
Any unremunerated excess reserves, i.e. the (usually small) 
amount  which  credit  institutions  hold  on  their  current 
accounts with the Eurosystem in excess of the minimum 
reserve requirements, constitute the third component of 
the banks’ liquidity requirements.
It  is  precisely  because  credit  institutions  face  structural 
liquidity needs which can only be met by the central bank 
that the latter is able to steer the overnight interest rate by 
adjusting the liquidity which it provides. In this connection 
it should be mentioned that credit institutions can obtain 
liquidity  from  the  Eurosystem  only  on  presentation  of 
adequate collateral (ECB, 2006). The Eurosystem accepts 
a broad range of assets as collateral, from government 
bonds to asset-backed securities. This is intended to pre-
vent credit institutions from being unable to obtain liquid-
ity purely because they do not have adequate collateral.
TABLE  1  CONSOLIDATED AND SIMPLIFIED BALANCE SHEET OF THE EUROSYSTEM





Net foreign assets  .......................... 322.78
Other autonomous factors (net)  .............. 98.13
 
Monetary policy instruments
Main reﬁnancing operations   ................. 290.35
Longer-term reﬁnancing operations  ........... 143.65
Marginal lending facility  ..................... 0.23
 




Banknotes in circulation  ..................... 620.11
Government deposits  ....................... 49.87
Current account holdings including the 
minimum reserve requirements  ............ 184.35
Monetary policy instruments
Fine-tuning operations (net)  .................. 0.49
Deposit facility  ............................. 0.32
 
Total  ..................................... 855.13
Source : ECB.
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fine-tuning  operations  were  conducted,  each  of  them 
taking place on the last day of the reserve maintenance 
period. On 13 February and 10 July, additional liquidity 
was provided totalling 2 and 2.5 billion euro respectively. 
Excess liquidity was absorbed on the following occasions : 
2.3 billion euro on 13 March, 22.5 billion on 17 April, 
2.46 billion on 14 May and 6 billion on 12 June. (1) In 2006, 
the Eurosystem had used fine-tuning operations on eleven 
occasions, each time on the last day of the reserve main-
tenance period. In absolute terms, the amounts of these 
operations averaged 9.9 billion euro.
In order to absorb residual liquidity imbalances (deficits or 
surpluses) of individual credit institutions, the Eurosystem 
set  up  standing  facilities.  Any  surplus  liquidity  can  be 
deposited on the deposit facility, while the marginal lend-
ing facility can be used to obtain liquidity until the next 
morning. It is mainly at the end of the reserve mainte-
nance  period  that  banks  use  the  standing  facilities.  In 
the first seven reserve maintenance periods of 2007, an 
average of 231 million euro was borrowed each day via 
the marginal lending facility, while an average of 321 mil-
lion  euro  a  day  was  placed  in  the  deposit  facility.  Use 
of the standing facilities on the last day of the reserve 
maintenance period has a considerable influence on these 
average amounts.
As usual, the credit institutions’ recourse to the standing 
facilities has been marginal overall, notably because of the 
punitive level of the associated interest rates. Moreover, 
the open market operations cover more or less all the 
banks’ liquidity needs, in accordance with the principle 
of neutrality adopted by the Eurosystem in regard to its 
liquidity management, the aim being to avoid any system-
atic bias in the use of the standing facilities.
The Eurosystem’s operational framework made it possible 
to stabilise the overnight rate around the desired level in 
the first seven reserve maintenance periods of 2007. Thus, 
the average daily spread, in absolute terms, between the 
Eonia (2) and the minimum bid rate of the main refinanc-
ing  operations  was  7  basis  points,  and  only  rarely  did 
it exceed 20 basis points. Also in 2006, the Eurosystem 
succeeded in keeping the overnight rate at a level very 
close to the minimum bid rate, even on the last day of the 
reserve  maintenance  period,  when  unexpected  fluctua-
tions in liquidity are more likely (NBB, 2007).
banking sector, the ECB publishes forecasts of the consoli-
dated liquidity needs, and these are used as the basis for 
calculating the benchmark allotment (ECB, 2004b). This 
benchmark allotment is calculated in such a way that the 
amount, if allotted, would enable the credit institutions to 
meet their reserve requirements smoothly, up to the day 
before the settlement of the next main refinancing opera-
tion. For that purpose, account is taken of the liquidity 
already allotted via the longer-term refinancing operations 
and  other  open  market operations,  the  liquidity imbal-
ance which has already accumulated since the start of the 
reserve maintenance period, and an estimate of future 
movements  in  both  the  autonomous  factors  and  the 
excess reserves. This benchmark allotment enables credit 
institutions to decide the amount of their bid. Moreover, 
since  March  2004  the  Eurosystem  has  published,  on 
the day of allotment of the main refinancing operation, 
an  update  of  the  benchmark  allotment  published  the 
day  before  when  the  main  refinancing  operation  was 
announced. Since 1 January 2005, in an effort to reduce 
the positive, though – under normal market conditions – 
small, difference between the minimum bid rate and the 
overnight rate, the Eurosystem has regularly opted to con-
duct a generous allotment policy consisting in allocating 
a volume of liquidity slightly greater than the benchmark 
allotment announced prior to each weekly tender. The 
(positive) difference between the amount actually allot-
ted and the benchmark allotment thus always came to 
1.00 billion euro in the first seven reserve maintenance 
periods of 2007. For 2006, the average difference came 
to 1.37 billion euro. A larger positive difference increases 
the probability of excess provision of liquidity at the end 
of the reserve maintenance period, exerting downward 
pressure on short-term interest rates. Conversely, allotting 
a smaller amount would exert upward pressure on short-
term interest rates.
The  Eurosystem  may  also  conduct  fine-tuning  opera-
tions. These may take the form of liquidity-providing or 
liquidity-absorbing  operations.  This  instrument  enables 
the  Eurosystem  to  attenuate  abnormal  fluctuations  in 
the  overnight  interest  rate  in  relation  to  the  minimum 
bid rate on the main refinancing operations. Fine-tuning 
operations are conducted mainly at the end of the reserve 
maintenance  periods.  Credit  institutions  have  to  meet 
their  reserve  requirements  on  average  over  the  reserve 
maintenance period, so that they can allow their current 
account holdings to fluctuate freely at the start of the 
period. However, since the reserve requirements become 
binding  towards  the  end  of  the  period,  there  can  be 
significant movements in money market rates, which the 
Eurosystem will try to attenuate by adjusting the liquidity 
which it provides via the fine-tuning operations. Thus, in 
the first seven reserve maintenance periods in 2007, six 
(1)  The total of liquidity-absorbing fine-tuning operations was constantly higher 
between 1 January and 30 April 2007 owing to accounting reasons related to 
Slovenia’s accession to the monetary union. Those amounts are disregarded here.
(2)    The Eonia is an effective overnight rate, calculated as the weighted average of 
the rates charged on unsecured loans by a panel of 49 banks on the interbank 
overnight market in the euro area.the liquidity mAnAgement of the eurosystem  
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maintenance period, however, the Eurosystem was forced 
to  conduct  additional  open  market  operations.  On  the 
morning of 9 August, the money market was unsettled by 
a sudden rise in the overnight rate (from 4.1 to 4.7 p.c.) 
following a surge in demand from credit institutions for 
current account holdings with the Eurosystem. This was 
caused by the growing tension on the American money 
market  and  the  European  banks’  fear  that  they  would 
get into difficulty following the turmoil on the American 
sub-prime mortgage market (cf. box 1). Having expressed 
its concern during the morning, the Eurosystem injected 
liquidity via an overnight fine-tuning operation in order to 
stabilise the overnight interest rate. This operation took 
the form of a fixed-rate tender at 4 p.c. (corresponding 
to the minimum bid rate), with the prior announcement 
that all the bids would be fulfilled. Forty-nine credit insti-
tutions submitted bids for a total of 94.8 billion euro with 
an  overnight  maturity.  The  overnight  interest  rate  thus 
subsided  to  a  level  close  to  the  minimum  bid  rate,  so 
that the Eonia – which is an average daily rate – came to 
4.22 p.c. on that day.
On  the  morning  of  10  August,  the  ECB  decided  to 
conduct another overnight fine-tuning operation as the 
liquidity injected by the previous day’s fine-tuning opera-
tion would disappear from the market, being an overnight 
operation. This was conducted as a variable rate tender 
without prior announcement of the amount of the allot-
ment. This would enable the Eurosystem to gain a clearer 
idea of the demand for liquidity from the banking sector. 
Sixty-two credit institutions submitted bids for a total of 
110 billion euro at interest rates ranging between 4.00 
and 4.15 p.c. The ECB decided to allot liquidity for all 
bids at a rate equal to or exceeding the marginal rate of 
4.05 p.c., so that 61.1 billion euro was allotted until the 
next working day at a weighted average rate of 4.08 p.c. 
This brought the Eonia down to 4.14 p.c. on that date.
On  Monday,  13  August,  in  a  context  of  very  subdued 
activity on the money market, the ECB conducted another 
fine-tuning operation with a specification similar to that 
of  10  August.  Fifty-nine  counterparties  submitted  bids 
for a total of 84.4 billion euro at interest rates ranging 
between 4.00 and 4.10 p.c. The Eurosystem decided to 
allot liquidity to all bids at or above 4.06 p.c., so that 
47.4 billion euro was allotted at a weighted average rate 
of 4.07 p.c. The Eonia stood at 4.10 p.c. on 13 August.
On the morning of 14 August, the Eurosystem decided to 
conduct another overnight fine-tuning operation in addi-
tion to the weekly main refinancing operation, in order to 
meet the additional need for liquidity which might arise 
from the fact that the main refinancing operation allot-
ted on that day would not be settled until the next day. 
3.    Facing strong demand for liquidity : 
liquidity management by the 
Eurosystem between 8 August and 
13 November 2007
As described above, the Eurosystem’s operational frame-
work  had  already  proved  its  soundness  under  normal 
market conditions. In the last three reserve maintenance 
periods,  it  has  also  proved  capable  of  coping  success-
fully with episodes of very strong demand for liquidity, 
and  –  even  when  market  conditions  were  strained  – 
satisfactorily stabilising the interest rates of the shortest 
segment  of  the  money  market  around  the  minimum 
bid  rate.  As  will  become  apparent  in  the  chronologi-
cal account of liquidity management below, during this 
period of tension on the financial markets, the practical 
implementation  of  the  operational  framework  –  which 
remained  unchanged  –  differed  in  three  respects  from 
what happens under normal market conditions. First, at 
the start of the reserve maintenance period, there was 
less reliance on the benchmark amounts as a guide for 
determining  the  amounts  actually  allotted  in  the  main 
refinancing operations, in an attempt to keep the mar-
ginal rate on those operations close to the minimum bid 
rate. This policy responded to demand for frontloading 
from the banking sector, i.e. the banks wanted to be able 
to meet the reserve requirements more than proportion-
ately at the start of the reserve maintenance period. In 
this way, it was the timing of the provision of liquidity 
during the reserve maintenance period that was altered, 
while the total amount allotted over the same period was 
unaffected. Second, greater use was made of fine-tuning 
operations, initially for the purpose of injecting liquidity 
and then, at the end of the reserve maintenance period, 
in order to absorb liquidity when it became apparent that 
the additional supply was beginning to exert downward 
pressure  on  the  overnight  interest  rate.  Consequently, 
both the number of fine-tuning operations – which in fact 
no longer took place solely on the last day of the reserve 
maintenance period – and their volume was stepped up. 
Third, the amount allotted in the longer-term refinancing 
operations was increased considerably on two occasions, 
to ensure that the credit institutions had a larger volume 
of liquidity available over three months.
3.1    Reserve maintenance period ending on 
11 September 2007
The reserve maintenance period running from 8 August 
to 11 September started under normal market conditions : 
as usual, the volume allotted in the first main refinanc-
ing operation slightly exceeded the benchmark amount 
(by one billion euro). On the second day of the reserve 32
was 14.5 billion greater than the benchmark volume at a 
marginal rate of 4.08 p.c. and a weighted average rate 
of 4.09 p.c. From 28 August onwards the Eonia began 
rising steadily again. On 29 August one of the regular 
longer-term refinancing operations reached maturity. In 
line with normal practice it was renewed and 50 billion 
euro was allotted, though without increasing the overall 
outstanding amount. The marginal rate and the weighted 
average rate of this operation came to 4.56 and 4.62 p.c. 
respectively.
On 4 September, the ECB allotted 5 billion euro more 
than the benchmark amount in the last main refinancing 
operation,  despite  the  approaching  end  of  the  reserve 
maintenance period, a time when the ECB normally tries 
to achieve balanced liquidity conditions in order to avoid 
large  fluctuations  in  the  overnight  rate.  However,  this 
operation proved to be less generous than the credit insti-
tutions expected, as the marginal rate and the weighted 
average  rate  came  to  4.15  and  4.19  p.c.  respectively. 
There was therefore renewed tension on the short-term 
segment of the money market, and the overnight interest 
rate climbed to 4.70 p.c. in the morning of 5 September, 
whereupon the Eurosystem announced that it was moni-
toring the situation closely and was standing by to inter-
vene if necessary. On 6 September it therefore conducted 
a variable rate fine-tuning operation with an overnight 
maturity, which injected 42.2 billion euro into the market. 
The marginal rate on this operation came to 4.06 p.c., 
well below the level of the marginal rate on the last main 
refinancing operation. The weighted average rate on this 
operation came to 4.13 p.c. The Eonia therefore declined 
on that date, falling to 4.05 p.c. The Governing Council 
decided on that same day not to adjust the key interest 
rates and to conduct another three-month longer term 
refinancing operation with no pre-announced allotment 
volume on 12 September, in order to help the money 
market to return to normal.
Given the abundant liquidity, the current account hold-
ings were well in excess of the level needed to meet the 
reserve  requirements.  At  the  end  of  the  reserve  main-
tenance  period,  this  inevitably  depresses  the  overnight 
interest rate so that the Eonia declined to 3.54 p.c. on 
10  September,  its  lowest  level  in  that  reserve  mainte-
nance period. In order to halt this downward pressure, on 
11 September – the last day of the reserve maintenance 
period in question – the Eurosystem conducted a liquidity-
absorbing fine-tuning operation. This operation withdrew 
60 billion euro from the market at a rate of 4.00 p.c. so 
that the Eonia climbed back up to 3.87 p.c.
Once again, the fine-tuning operation was conducted by 
means of a variable rate tender without a pre-announced 
allotment amount. Bids were submitted for a total of 46 
billion euro, and the rates offered ranged between 4.00 
and 4.09 p.c. All bids at rates equal to or exceeding 4.07 
p.c. were fulfilled, so that 7.7 billion euro was allotted 
at a weighted average rate of 4.07 p.c. Apart from this 
fine-tuning operation, the ECB decided to allot 73.5 bil-
lion euro more than the benchmark amount in the main 
refinancing operation on 14 August. This operation aimed 
to prevent the outflows in the current account holdings 
of  credit  institutions  which  would  have  resulted  from 
the “mechanical” allotment of the benchmark volume, 
because that amount takes account of the past current 
account holdings in estimating the liquidity needs arising 
from the reserve requirements which have to be met on 
average during the period in question. As a result of the 
ample  supply  of  liquidity  which,  under  normal  circum-
stances, would have caused demand to moderate during 
the rest of the reserve maintenance period, those holdings 
had increased sharply in the initial weeks of the reserve 
maintenance period. However, that automatic neutralisa-
tion was at odds with the tension on the money market, 
since demand for liquidity remained high. The marginal 
rate and the average rate of the main refinancing opera-
tion mentioned above stood at 4.08 and 4.10 p.c. respec-
tively.  After  this  allotment  in  excess  of  the  benchmark 
volume, the Eonia stabilised over the next few days in the 
region of 4 p.c.
Since substantial excess reserves had accumulated in the 
initial weeks of the reserve maintenance period, the ECB 
decided to set the allotment volume of the main refinanc-
ing operations on 21 August, 28 August and 4 September 
at  a  level  which  would  permit  a  gradual  reduction  in 
the  current  account  holdings.  On  22  August,  the  ECB 
Governing Council also decided to conduct an additional 
longer-term  refinancing  operation,  as  financing  needs 
were particularly acute on this money market segment 
given the sharp rise in the three-month interbank rate. 
This operation injected 40 billion euro into the market on 
24 August, for a three-month period, at a marginal rate 
of 4.49 p.c. and a weighted average rate of 4.61 p.c. 
The Eurosystem announced that this operation would not 
affect the regular monthly longer-term refinancing opera-
tions, but that the amount allotted in the main refinancing 
operations would compensate for this supply of liquidity. 
In the main refinancing operation on 21 August, 46 bil-
lion euro more than the benchmark amount was allotted 
at a marginal rate of 4.08 p.c. and a weighted average 
rate of 4.09 p.c. Following this relatively substantial injec-
tion of liquidity, the Eonia declined significantly to around 
3.7 p.c. in the week following the operation. In the main 
refinancing operation on 28 August, the amount allotted the liquidity mAnAgement of the eurosystem  
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CHART 1  THE LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT OF THE EUROSYSTEM (1)
  (daily outstanding amounts, billions of euro unless otherwise stated)
Source : ECB.
(1)  The vertical grey lines indicate the last day of the reserve maintenance periods.
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Box 1  –  Causes of the liquidity shortage
This box examines how the problems affecting a relatively small market such as the United States sub-prime 
mortgage market (a market in mortgage loans to borrowers with a particularly poor credit rating) had global 
repercussions on other segments of the financial markets, eventually creating a liquidity shortage on the money 
markets necessitating central bank intervention. Securitisation played a key role in these events.
Loans granted by a credit institution are traditionally recorded on its balance sheet until maturity. However, 
securitisation enables the bank to remove these illiquid assets from its balance sheet and convert them into 
liquid assets via an entity set up specifically for that purpose (also known as a Special Purpose Vehicle, SPV). An 
SPV has its own legal personality and is therefore separate from the bank which set it up (bankruptcy remote). 
Nevertheless, it may have a back-up credit line with that bank.
In the case of conventional securitisation, the loans of a credit institution are pooled and sold to the SPV (this is 
called true sale securitisation). Afterwards, the loans are repaid to the SPV, enabling the SPV in turn to repay its 
investors. In contrast, in the case of synthetic securitisation, only the credit risk is transferred, and not the loans. 
This form of securitisation is effected via derivatives (credit default swaps) which enable a bank to hedge against 
the risk of default.
In the case of “conventional” pass-through securitisation, the cash-flows are passed on without distinction to 
the investors as they come in, but securities issued via SPVs are currently often split up and divided into tranches, 
thus creating structured financing instruments. Each tranche has a risk profile which reflects the allocation of the 
losses and gains on the underlying assets among the various tranches (subordination), making it possible to issue 
a certain number of securities with a high rating such as AAA or AA (credit enhancement). The new instruments 
(known as asset-backed securities, ABS) are ultimately sold with different ratings. Some entities, such as asset-
backed commercial paper conduits (ABCP conduits) and structured investment vehicles (SIVs), which invest in these 
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products, issue short-term paper to finance their longer-term assets. By investing long and lending short, they incur 
a liquidity risk in the same way as a traditional bank.
As a result of securitisation, the risks are no longer concentrated on the bank but spread through the financial 
system. In itself, that risk dispersion is welcome, but it now makes it very difficult to locate the risks. The lack 
of transparency regarding the effective exposure resulting from these complex structures has heightened the 
uncertainty. Since some of these products may be highly complex, it is a major challenge to value them at a time 
of tensions on the financial markets. These valuation problems were most acute in the case of products with a 
direct or indirect exposure to sub-prime mortgages, but they also emerged in the form of higher risk premiums for 
other structured financing instruments. The market in some debt instruments dried up owing to the information 
asymmetries, as demonstrated by Akerlof’s analysis of the “market for lemons” (Akerlof, 1970, in which the 
lemons are defective second-hand cars). In the end, it was not only mortgage-backed securities that came under 
pressure, but the entire ABS market.
Owing to the increased risk aversion, it became difficult for the above-mentioned entities to raise finance by 
issuing short-term commercial paper (CP). The commercial paper market in the United States is huge. Before 
the crisis erupted, the outstanding amount of CP was around 2,225 billion dollars, which illustrates the market’s 
success. However, by mid-October 2007, this figure had already fallen by 16 p.c. to 1,869 billion dollars and it 
has remained around that level since then. That decline was due to the massive fall in ABCP, which amounted 
to 27.5 p.c. mid-November. In the euro area, on the other hand, the market is still highly segmented, but the 
market in euro commercial paper (ECP), which transcends international borders, is gaining in importance. In July 
2007 the outstanding total in commercial paper on this market reached the equivalent of 869 billion dollars before 
falling by 9 p.c. in September to 792 billion (owing to the depreciation of the dollar, the decline would be even 
greater if the amounts were stated in euro). This seems to indicate that the ABCP issuers were no longer able to 
refinance themselves and renew the securities which they had issued once they matured. Furthermore, there was 
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lower than in the two longer-term refinancing operations 
conducted since the start of the period of money market   
turmoil.
The settlement of the longer-term refinancing operation 
exerted downward pressure on the Eonia, which dropped 
from 4.11 p.c. on the first day of the reserve maintenance 
period to 3.96 p.c. on 13 September. This decline con-
tinued in the ensuing days, so that by 17 September the 
Eonia was down to 3.57 p.c. On Tuesday, 18 September, 
36 billion euro more than the benchmark amount was 
allotted in the main refinancing operation. The marginal 
rate  and  the  weighted  average  rate  of  this  operation 
came to 4.15 and 4.16 p.c. respectively. In comparison 
with the very ample liquidity conditions prevailing in the 
first week of the reserve maintenance period – not only 
was  10  billion  euro  more  than  the  benchmark  volume 
allotted in the main refinancing operation, but an addi-
tional 75 billion euro was allotted in the longer-term refi-
nancing operation – this tender can be seen as a first step 
towards  normalisation.  On  Wednesday  19  September, 
the settlement date of the main refinancing operation, 
the Eonia therefore climbed to 4.1 p.c., and the overnight 
interest rate continued to hover around that level in the 
ensuing days.
The  substantial  provision  of  liquidity  during  the  initial 
weeks of the reserve maintenance period was reflected in 
the level of the credit institutions’ current account hold-
ings, which exceeded the levels recorded in other reserve 
maintenance periods. Recourse to the standing facilities 
was limited overall, although there was a slight increase 
in the average recourse to the deposit facility.
3.2   Reserve maintenance period ending on 
9 October 2007
In  the  first  main  refinancing  operation  of  the  reserve 
maintenance period on 11 September (with settlement 
the next day), 10 billion euro more than the benchmark 
amount was allotted at a marginal rate of 4.14 p.c. and 
a weighted average rate of 4.17 p.c. The Eurosystem also 
announced that, in setting the benchmark allotment for 
this operation, it had taken no account of the amount 
of liquidity that would be allotted for three months on 
12 September in the additional longer-term refinan  cing 
operation  announced  previously.  Eventually,  the  ECB 
decided  to  allot  75  billion  in  that  operation.  The  mar-
ginal rate and the average rate of this operation came to 
4.35 and 4.52 p.c. respectively, or about ten basis points 
This put the ball back in the banks’ court, mainly via two mechanisms. They either had to provide liquidity for 
the ABCP conduits and SIV’s via the back-up credit lines available to the latter from their associate bank, or 
they had to take some of the assets off the balance sheet of those entities in order to lighten it. In either case, 
the credit institutions were obliged to seek the necessary finance, so that they began to hoard up liquidity. In 
addition, banks refused to lend one another funds in the face of uncertainty regarding the potential exposure of 
the counterparties.
Under these conditions which threatened to paralyse the operation of the interbank market, the benchmark 
amounts on which the Eurosystem bases its allotments in the main refinancing operations become irrelevant, 
because the benchmark figures are based on parameters (mainly the autonomous factors and the minimum 
reserve  requirements)  for  the  consolidated  banking  system,  in  the  knowledge  that,  under  normal  market 
conditions, credit institutions with surplus liquidity and those with a liquidity shortage soon find one another on 
the interbank market. However, in the event of a crisis of confidence, the individual credit institutions express 
additional demand for central bank reserves so that the total demand for liquidity at the level of the consolidated 
banking system far exceeds the normal benchmark amounts which are not influenced by the financial market 
turmoil. In other words, the demand for central bank money experiences a substantial upward shock. Under such 
conditions, it is desirable to provide additional liquidity to stabilise the overnight interest rate.
Providing appropriate liquidity ensures that credit institutions with a liquidity shortage have access to resources 
so that solvent institutions are protected against the risk of a simple liquidity shortage forcing them to sell assets 
or contract loans, which could lead them into solvency problems. However, that does not mean that credit 
institutions which face solvency problems as a result of excessive risk-taking will be bailed out, since the supply of 
liquidity via the open market operations is conditional upon the pledging of adequate collateral.the liquidity mAnAgement of the eurosystem  
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easy for credit institutions to obtain liquidity via the open 
market operations at the start of the reserve maintenance 
period, and to dispose of any surpluses at the end of that 
period without incurring serious penalties. However, that 
does not mean that credit institutions can systematically 
get such favourable conditions when they apply to the 
Eurosystem. Indeed, when credit institutions resort to the 
Eurosystem outside of the open market operations they 
have to use the standing facilities which are associated 
with punitive interest rates.
3.3    Reserve maintenance period ending on 
13 November 2007
In  the  first  main  refinancing  operation  of  the  reserve 
maintenance  period,  which  was  allotted  on  9  October 
with settlement the next day, 40 billion euro more than 
the benchmark volume was allotted at a marginal rate of 
4.12 p.c. and a weighted average rate of 4.16 p.c. This 
ample allotment unexpectedly pushed the Eonia down to 
3.82 p.c. on 11 October, so that the Eurosystem decided 
to conduct a fine-tuning operation to absorb liquidity on 
12 October. This mopped up 30 billion euro at a fixed rate 
of 4 p.c. for five days, until settlement of the next main 
refinancing  operation,  thus  keeping  the  Eonia  steady 
around that level from 15 October.
In the next three main refinancing operations, 18, 14.5 
and  9.5  billion  euro  above  the  benchmark  allotment 
respectively were allotted at marginal and weighted aver-
age rates comparable to those of the first main refinancing 
operation. On 31 October, the Eonia climbed to 4.13 p.c. 
owing to the month-end effects, whereas it had remained 
stable in the two preceding weeks (at around 4 p.c.). On 
the same day, a regular longer-term refinancing operation 
which had matured was renewed at a marginal rate of 
4.45 p.c. and a weighted average rate of 4.53 p.c.
Finally,  in  the  last  main  refinancing  operation  of  the 
reserve maintenance period, 3.5 billion euro more than 
the benchmark volume was allotted on 6 November at a 
marginal rate of 4.14 p.c. and a weighted average rate of 
4.15 p.c. At the end of the reserve maintenance period, 
however, the Eonia dropped below 4 p.c., prompting the 
Eurosystem  to  conduct  a  fine-tuning  operation  on  the 
last day of the reserve maintenance period, to withdraw 
liquidity at a fixed rate of 4 p.c. This operation only ena-
bled the Eurosystem to take 27.75 billion euro out of the 
market, which was less than it had aimed for. On that day, 
the Eonia dropped to 3.76 p.c. as credit institutions tried 
to place their surplus liquidity in the interbank market, 
driving  down  the  overnight  rate.  The  residual  liquidity 
surplus,  equivalent  to  8.8  billion  euro,  was  ultimately 
In  the  main  refinancing  operation  on  25  September, 
33  billion  euro  more  than  the  benchmark  volume  was 
allotted at a marginal rate of 4.27 p.c. and a weighted 
average  rate  of  4.29  p.c.  Around  that  date,  owing  in 
particular  to  the  tension  normally  seen  at  the  end  of 
a  quarter,  the  Eonia  rose  to  around  4.2  p.c.  On  27 
September, a regular longer-term refinancing operation 
comprising 50 billion euro was renewed without provid-
ing additional liquidity for the market. The marginal rate 
and the weighted average rate of this operation came to 
4.50 and 4.63 p.c. respectively, exceeding the rates of 
the longer-term operation allotted on 12 September. On 
1  October,  once  the  end-of-quarter  effects  had  faded, 
the Eonia stood at 3.86 p.c., bearing witness to a situa-
tion of abundant liquidity. On 2 October, in the last main 
refinancing operation of the reserve maintenance period, 
7.5 billion euro more than the benchmark volume was 
allotted at a marginal rate of 4.14 p.c. and a weighted 
average rate of 4.16 p.c. On that date, the Eonia stood 
at 3.83 p.c. To prevent further downward pressure on the 
overnight interest rate, 24.5 billion euro was taken out of 
the market on 9 October, the last day of the reserve main-
tenance period, by means of a fine-  tuning operation at a 
fixed rate of 4 p.c. The Eonia was 3.95 p.c. on that day. 
The day before, when announcing the first main refinanc-
ing  operation  of  the  next  reserve  maintenance  period, 
the  Eurosystem  had  issued  a  statement  indicating  that 
it would reinforce its policy of allocating more liquidity 
than the benchmark amount in main refinancing opera-
tions to accommodate the demand of counterparties to 
fulfil reserve requirements early within the maintenance 
period.  Yet,  it  would  aim  for  gradually  more  balanced 
liquidity conditions towards the end of the period, taking 
into  account  the  prevailing  market  conditions.  It  also 
announced  that  it  would  steer  liquidity  towards  more 
balanced conditions also during the maintenance period, 
in a way which is consistent with the objective to keep 
very  short-term  rates  close  to  the  minimum  bid  rate. 
The Eurosystem would follow this policy for as long as   
needed.
In the reserve maintenance period under review, credit 
institutions increased their recourse to the deposit facility. 
Thus, during the ninth reserve maintenance period daily 
recourse to this facility averaged 1.56 billion euro, whereas 
in the previous maintenance period it had averaged only 
445 million euro. There was also greater recourse to the 
marginal lending facility – an average of 312 million euro 
was borrowed each day during the reserve maintenance 
period,  compared  to  178  million  euro  in  the  previous 
period. For instance, on 26 September, 3.9 billion euro 
was  borrowed  via  the  marginal  lending  facility.  The 
Eurosystem’s  liquidity  management  places  the  banking 
system as a whole in a comfortable position by making it 38
the beginning of August to 4.75 p.c. on 5 September. 
It then dipped slightly before beginning to rise again in 
early October, as the due date would thenceforward come 
after the end of the year. Such calendar effects do also 
occur under normal market conditions, but are then less 
pronounced. Thereafter, the three-month Euribor fell to 
4.57 p.c. on 13 November.
Interest rates in the longer-term segment of the inter-
bank  market  are  influenced  by  a  number  of  factors. 
For  instance,  expectations  regarding  future  monetary 
policy decisions have a major influence on longer-term 
interest rates. While expectations of further interest rate 
hikes explained the positive spread between longer-term 
interbank rates and the minimum bid rate of the main 
refinancing operations up to the beginning of August, 
that was not true subsequently, since expectations of a 
further tightening of monetary policy soon ebbed away 
following the turmoil on the financial markets. Moreover, 
longer-term interest rates include a term premium which 
compensates for the uncertainty over future interest rate 
movements and which, in the given circumstances, reflects 
a greater preference for longer-term funding in particular. 
Finally, these interest rates include a premium covering 
the possible risk of payment default – the Euribor is in fact 
the rate on interbank loans without collateral. This last 
put in the deposit facility. This was   therefore the greatest 
recourse to the deposit facility during the first ten reserve 
maintenance periods of 2007.
3.4    Interest rate structure on the money market
The foregoing demonstrates that, during the period of 
turmoil extending from early August to mid November, 
the Eurosystem succeeded in stabilising interest rates on 
the shortest segment of the money market – the marginal 
rate of the main refinancing operations and the Eonia – 
but it cannot be denied that those rates were more vola-
tile than usual during that period. Thus, in absolute terms 
the average spread between the Eonia and the minimum 
bid rate on the main refinancing operations increased to 
17 basis points during the three reserve maintenance peri-
ods which ran from 8 August to 13 November, whereas 
that  spread  had  been  only  7  basis  points  in  the  first 
seven reserve maintenance periods of 2007. However, in 
the longer-term segment of the money market, interest 
rates on interbank loans without collateral rose sharply 
at the beginning of August and remained at a high level 
for the rest of the period under review. This movement 
was particularly marked in the case of the three-month 
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factor which is taken into account in deciding the mon-
etary policy stance. The possible, but hard to quantify, 
influence  on  the  real  economy  of  the  financial  market 
turmoil – not only following the rise in interest rates on 
the longer segment of the money market but also, for 
example, owing to the widening of the corporate bond 
spreads, the announcement of a tightening of credit con-
ditions in the bank lending survey, the euro’s appreciation 
and the possible repercussions on the confidence of the 
economic  agents  –  in  fact  heightened  the  uncertainty 
over the growth and inflation outlook. This prompted the 
Governing  Council,  following  the  September,  October 
and November meetings, to wait for more detailed infor-
mation before drawing further conclusions for monetary 
policy, despite the confirmed existence of upside risks to 
price stability. The upshot was that the originally expected 
rise in interest rates did not materialise.
Conclusion
The effectiveness of the Eurosystem’s operational frame-
work (this set of instruments and procedures enables the 
Eurosystem to steer money market interest rates towards 
the level desired by the Governing Council) has been put 
to the test in recent months. This article described the 
implementation of monetary policy under normal market 
conditions. It then examined in detail the way in which 
the Eurosystem managed liquidity on the money market 
during  the  three  reserve  maintenance  periods  which 
extended from the beginning of August to mid November, 
a period characterized by financial market turmoil.
Despite the difficult conditions on the money market, the 
Eurosystem  succeeded  in  bringing  money  market  rates 
close to the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing 
operations set by the Governing Council, thus preserving 
the signal on the monetary policy stance given by short-
term interest rates. Flexible use of the existing operational 
framework, which was therefore not modified in any way, 
was sufficient to achieve that. Thus, in order to enable credit 
institutions to meet the reserve requirement fairly early in 
the reserve maintenance period, the Eurosystem supplied, 
via its main refinancing operations, a volume of liquid-
ity well in excess of the benchmark amounts calculated 
beforehand. The Eurosystem also made greater use of the 
fine-tuning operations which, in contrast to normal prac-
tice, were not confined to the last day of the reserve main-
tenance period and also involved larger amounts. Finally, 
it  enabled  the  credit  institutions  to  obtain  longer-term 
liquidity by refinancing a larger part of the liquidity deficit 
via the longer-term three-month refinancing operations. 
An operational framework which gives priority to stabilis-
ing money market interest rates implies that the balance 
premium currently seems to be a decisive factor driving 
up   longer-term rates on the money market. The spread   
between the unsecured three-month Euribor (the rate at 
which banks lend one another funds without collateral) 
and the three-month Eurepo (the rate at which banks lend 
one another funds against collateral) suddenly increased 
at the beginning of August to 60 basis points, after hover-
ing around 7 basis points during the first seven months of 
2007. This spread then stabilised before widening again   
at  the  beginning  of  October  as  a  result  of  calendar 
effects,  reaching  around  70  basis  points.  Thereafter, 
the spread decreased to around 50 basis points on 13 
November. The Eurepo itself fell slightly during August 
and September, after expectations of subsequent inter-
est rate hikes faded away. That factor also explains the 
decline  in  the  yield  on  German  three-month  treasury 
certificates. Additional downward pressure on that yield 
also  came  from  the  safe  haven  status  of  government 
paper in periods of financial market turmoil, which may 
have a considerable impact on a relatively small market. 
The  spread  between  the  three-month  Euribor  and  the 
yield on German three-month treasury certificates there-
fore climbed to around 100 basis points at the beginning 
of October after which it declined to around 60 basis 
points on 13 November. During July, it had already edged 
upwards to 20 basis points, after remaining around 10 
basis points in the first half of 2007. It is therefore appar-
ent that banks were demanding higher risk premiums in 
a context of uncertainty over credit institutions’ degree of 
exposure to the troubled American sub-prime mortgage 
market.  Moreover,  a  number  of  banks  probably  also 
hesitated to grant interbank loans pending clarification 
of their own liquidity situation, and that also drove up 
longer-term interbank interest rates.
The  fluctuations  on  the  longer-term  segment  of  the 
money  market,  resulting  from  the  behaviour  of  credit 
institutions  and  their  risk  perception,  are  beyond  the 
control of the central bank. In fact, by its liquidity man-
agement  the  Eurosystem  can  only  exert  direct  control 
over very short-term interest rates. The consequences of 
the strong movements which occurred in the longer-term 
segment  of  the  money  market  may,  however,  extend 
beyond  the  interbank  market  in  that  the  three-month 
interbank rate, as measured by the Euribor, is used as a 
benchmark by many credit institutions for a wide range 
of  interest  rates  applicable  to  loans  granted  to  house-
holds and to non-financial corporations. If the increase 
in the three-month Euribor were to be passed on, that 
would  imply  a  real  tightening  of  financing  conditions, 
even in the absence of any adjustment to the key inter-
est rates of the Eurosystem. Although the central bank 
cannot remedy that by its liquidity management, such a 
potential tightening of financing conditions is certainly a 40
compensation demanded by credit institutions to cover the 
risk of default on the unsecured interbank loan market. 
Of course, that development may have some impact on 
the real economy, and hence on the future movements 
in inflation. Many credit institutions in fact use the three-
month  Euribor  as  the  benchmark  for  a  wide  range  of 
interest  rates  applicable  to  loans  to  households  and  to 
non-financial  corporations.  If  the  increase  in  the  three-
month Euribor were to be passed on, that would imply a 
real tightening of credit conditions, even in the absence of 
any adjustment to the key interest rates of the Eurosystem. 
Such a potential tightening of credit conditions is certainly 
a factor which is taken into account when deciding the 
monetary policy stance. The possible but hard to quantify 
influence  on  the  real  economy  of  the  financial  market 
turmoil prompted the Governing Council, following the 
September, October and November meetings, to wait for 
more detailed information before drawing further conclu-
sions for monetary policy, despite the confirmed existence 
of upside risks to price stability. That is why the rise in 
interest rates initially expected did not materialise.
sheet of the central bank, and more particularly the supply 
of base money, becomes endogenous, so that it does not 
signal the monetary policy stance (cf. seperate article on 
this subject in this edition of the Economic Review). The 
injections of liquidity which were sometimes very substan-
tial therefore do not in any way point to an easing of the 
monetary policy stance, which remained unchanged as 
the key rates were not adjusted during the period under   
review.
Despite  the  relatively  successful  stabilisation  of  short-
term money market interest rates, the longer-term rates 
increased sharply during the period under review. However, 
the central bank cannot remedy that by its liquidity man-
agement. The direct influence which the Eurosystem exerts 
on money market rates is in fact confined to the very short 
term. Conversely, it is the market itself that determines 
the interest rates for more distant horizons, according to 
expectations  concerning  monetary  policy  decisions  and 
relevant  risk  premiums.  The  rise  in  longer-term  money 
market  rates  in  fact  reflects  the  strong  increase  in  the the liquidity mAnAgement of the eurosystem  
during the period of finAnciAl turmoil
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